英文翻译时哪些语法和中文不同？翻译时要注意哪些原则？
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翻译专业的怒答 既然是英语类问题我就用英语回答吧 在中文里找不到什么特别合适的词来翻译需要例子再上例子具体分析 这里先只做回答The most important difference between English and Chinese in syntax：English modification and subordination vs Chinese coordination and predication【翻译的时候一定要注意这两种语言在语法结构上根本的区别The most important skill of Chinese-English translation：Find the focus and construct the modification, better a hierarchy structure.【中译英时候屡试不爽的一个方法The the most important criteria of translation: informativeness and effectiveness.【其实可以把它理解为翻译过程中的what&how说翻译的时候不考虑语法的都是耍流氓....通顺与否很大程度上就是由语法决定的一边说着不考虑语法 一边又说要通顺 这什么心理【x中文语法跟英文语法有很多差别，如果不注意在翻译的时候及时调整的话就会出现“翻译腔” 失败的翻译就是现在市面上很多书怎么读怎么别扭不知道题主是不是英语专业的 总之翻译就是要在学习理论之后不断的实践 大学的话起码十万字的双向翻译 单向的效果很慢 翻译的功力是要靠日积月累的 加油吧
翻译时候不考虑语法。翻译的原则估计并不完全一致。我遵从的是：忠实+通顺。谢邀。
述语和主语的划分——by 陈用仪这种一回答就是不知道多少篇论文的题目，我不知道应该怎么回答呀——古希腊哲学家忒恩波恩.勒耶
英语专业 ，大一上第一节课讲翻译的原则：信 达
后来自己在工作中也慢慢总结到：有形和无形 ，’有形‘就是传达出来的 实际的意思 ，无形 -汉语文章大部分是点到即止 话不说透，一语双关，而如果要传达给英文读都就必须将无形中的东西 ，理解透，再表达出来。
你可曾坠入爱河？很可怕不是？它让你如此脆弱。它打开了你的胸膛，敞开了你的心脏，也就是谁都可以跑到你内部，把你搞得一团糟。你建造了这一切的防御，你打造了一整套的盔甲，没有什么可以伤害到你；接着来了一个愚蠢的人，和其他任何一个愚蠢的人没有什么两样，闯入了你愚蠢的生活......你把你的一片给了他们。他们还没要过。他们整天悄无声息，只是吻你一下，对你微笑，但你的生活不再是你自己的生活。爱劫持了你。它进入了你的腹地。它耗尽你，留你在黑暗中哭泣，“或许我们只应是朋友”，这么简单的一句话却成了一块破璃碎片，直扎到你的心眼里去。痛啊。不只是想象的痛。不只是心里的痛。那是灵魂的痛，真正地从内部把你撕破的痛。我恨爱情。“Have you ever been in love? Horrible isn't it? It makes you so vulnerable. It opens your chest and it opens up your heart and it means that someone can get inside you and mess you up. You build up all these defenses, you build up a whole suit of armor, so that nothing can hurt you, then one stupid person, no different from any other stupid person, wanders into your stupid life...You give them a piece of you. They didn't ask for it. They did something dumb one day, like kiss you or smile at you, and then your life isn't your own anymore. Love takes hostages. It gets inside you. It eats you out and leaves you crying in the darkness, so simple a phrase like 'maybe we should be just friends' turns into a glass splinter working its way into your heart. It hurts. Not just in the imagination. Not just in the mind. It's a soul-hurt, a real gets-inside-you-and-rips-you-apart pain. I hate love.”------------------------------我在少年的时候发现了它，之后便急切渴望着去经历那些可以作为这音乐的创作源泉的人生，现在而立之年的我，却要去极力忍住【因为听着这首歌，而】被重新揭开的伤疤所带来的眼泪但是，这是一个多么放纵自我，馨香四溢的悲伤方式。这首歌献给那些曾经爱过而又失去的人。As a teenager discovering it I yearned for the life experiences that could inspire such music and as a thirty-something I have to hold back the tears as old wounds are made raw again. But what a self indulgent and heavily perfumed way to grieve. For all who have loved and lost. ----------------------------如果你有能力购买一些既不能填饱肚子又不能遮风挡雨的奇特东西， 而且这些东西需要耗费贵重的资源、长期的制作、 创作晦涩的文本，以及和精英阶层保持亲密的关系， 那么 ， 还有比这更好的证据来证明你拥有足够的财富吗？…… 除去所有琐碎而卑微的生活必需品之外，人们其实只是在一些昂贵而又无用的事物上找到了自己的尊贵......What better proof that you have money to spare than your being able to spend it on doodads and stunts that don't fill the belly or keep the rain out but that require precious materials, years of practice, a command of obscure texts, or intimacy with the elite?......people find dignity in the signs of an honorably futile existence removed from all menial necessities.------------------------------当联合航空93号班机和其他三架飞机在9·11事件中被劫持的时候，值得注意的是，知道自己命不久矣的乘客打给最亲近家属的电话的要点都是“我爱你”。马丁·艾米斯（Martin Amis）强调了保罗式的观点，即真正重要的是爱：“爱是一个抽象的名词，朦胧的东西。但当天地颠倒，万物远去之时，爱却成了我们唯一坚固的部分。”但这里还有疑虑：这种对爱的绝望的供认，不也是一件羞耻的事情吗，就像某人突然面对危险或死亡的临近，转向了上帝并祈祷一样，它是因恐惧而迈出的虚伪的机会主义的一步，而不是真正的相信？为什么在这样绝望的时刻，我们所做的事情中应当有更多的真理？在这样的时刻，难道不是生存的本能使我们背叛了自己的欲望吗？在这个意义上，临终之际的转变或爱的供述就是欲望的牺牲。何为一个真正的道德行动上：设想一位妻子在生命的最后一刻给丈夫打电话，并告诉他：“我只想让你知道，我们的婚姻是一个耻辱，我无法忍受你......When the United Airlines Flight 93 and three other planes were
significant
the gist of
phone calls to
their closest relatives from the passengers who knew they
were about to die was "I love you." Martin Amis emphasised the
Paulinian point that all
ultimately
abstract noun, something
nebulous. And yet love turns out to be the only part of us that
as the world turns
up-side down and the screen goes
black." However, a sus-picion remains here: is this
desperate confession of
love also not something of a
same kind of
God and prayer of someone who suddenly faces
the danger or proximity of death - a hyp-ocritical opportunistic
of true conviction? Why should there be more truth in what we do
desperate moments?
rather that,
in such moments, the survival instinct makes
us betray our desire?
conversions
confes-sions
sacrifices
of desire. What
would have been
ethical act:
imagine a wife phoning her
life to tell him: "Just
wanted to let
marriage was a sham, that I
cannot stand the sight of
"-----------------------------------------常识告诉我们，人们的实际生活，具有丰富经验和实践的真实个体的实际生活，是不能被降低为意识形态的“自觉”化身的。但我们应该抛弃的恰恰是这种对非意识形态的生活世界的依恋。所以，艾尔弗雷德·耶利内克（Elfriede Jelinek）对戏剧作者的忠告不仅在美学上是正确的，同时也具有一种深刻的道德合理性： 舞台上的角色应该单调，就像时装秀上的衣服一样：你所得到的不应该比你看到的更多。心理现实主义是可憎的，因为它允许我们通过遁入角色的“奢华”，在个体性格的深度中迷失自我来逃避令人不快的现实。作家的任务是阻止这样的逃避，把我们驱逐到某一点上，让我们用冷静的目光来直面恐怖。换言之，我们应该抵制这样的诱惑：用我们人格内容的丰富来填补空虚。Common sense tells us that the actual lives of people, of real individuals with their wealth of experience and practice, cannot be reduced to a "spontaneous" impersonation of ideology. But it is precisely this recourse to the non-ideological lifeworld that one should abandon. This is why Elfriede Jelinek's advice to theater writers is not only aesthetically correct, but has a deep ethical justification: Characters on stage should be flat, like clothes in a fashion show: what you get should be no more than what you see. Psychological realism is repulsive, because it allows us to escape unpalatable reality by taking shelter in the "luxuriousness" of personality, losing ourselves in the depth of individual character. The writer's task is to block this manoeuvre, to chase us off to a point from which we can view the horror with a dispassionate
other words, we should resist the urge to fill in the void with the rich texture of what makes us a person-----------------------把主体化约为一块白板，掏空它的所有实质内容，以及它的重生，从零点开始的重新创造。重生的主题在这里被赋予了一种清晰的批判-意识形态的扭曲：通过把自己变成威尔森，汉密尔顿实现了他一直梦想的生活；但当他意识到，这些僭越的梦想是他试图逃避的同一个压抑的现实之一部分时，事情就可怕地变得糟糕了。换言之，汉密尔顿-威尔森为自己对过去的不彻底否定付出了苦涩的代价：他的革命无法变革自身的前提。黑格尔预感到了这样的必然性，他写道：“要改变一个腐败的道德体制及其构造和合法性，却不改变宗教，这是现代的愚蠢之举，是一场没有变革的革命。”the reduction of the subject to a tabula rasa,
the emptying of all its substantial content, and its rebirth, its recreation from a zero-point. The motif of rebirth is here given a clear critico-ideological twist: transforming himself into to Wilson, Hamilton realizes what but things go terribly wrong when he becomes aware that those transgressive dreams were part of the same oppressive reality from which he had tried to escape. In other words, Hamilton-Evans pays the bitter price for the
fact that his negation of the past was not radical enough: his revolution failed to revolutionize its own presuppositions. Hegel had a presentiment of this necessity when he wrote: "It is a modern folly to alter a corrupt ethical system, its constitution and legislation, without changing the religion, to have a revolution without a reformation."---------------------------埃德蒙顿的根本的“掏空”是由其行动的沉默方式展现的，尤其是在他为父亲提供一杯有毒的牛奶的镜头里。埃德蒙德用一种无情的、疲倦的、苍白的目光看着父亲，没有丝毫的恐惧、怜悯、后悔或任何其他的感情。对埃德蒙德的一切“认同”都在这里遭到了挫败——我们，观众，无法和埃德蒙德一起颤栗，感受他的紧张，对其行为感到后悔或恐怖：“埃德蒙顿，他在一部更加传统的电影里会成为观众认同的中心，但这里，他似乎是一个空集，一个空洞的整数，一个效应的焦点。”Edmund's radical "emptying" is displayed by his very reticent way of acting, especially in the scene in which he provides his father with the glass of poisoned milk. Edmund watches his father with an inexpressive, tired, pale gaze, with no trace of fear, compassion, regret, or any other sentiment. Any kind of "identification" with Edmund is thereby thwarted-we, the viewers, cannotshiver with Edmund, feel his tension, regret, or horror at his act: "Edmund, who in a more conventional film would be the focus of audience identification, here seems rather a kind of null set, an empty integer, a focal point of effects."-----------------------------------------为此，基督教是反智慧的：智慧告诉我们，我们的努力是徒劳的，一切都将终结于混沌，而基督教疯狂地坚持着不可能性。爱，尤其是基督的爱，就绝不是智慧的。这就是为什么，圣保罗说：“我将摧毁智者的智慧”（其拉丁语的名言是Sapientiam sapientum perdam）。我们应该从字面上采用“智慧”一词：它是保罗所质疑的智慧（在“现实”地接受事物之所是的意义上），而非知识本身。For this reason, Christianity is anti-wisdom: wisdom tells us that our efforts are in vain, that everything ends in chaos, while Christianity madly insists on the impossible. Love, especially a Christian one, is definitely not wise. This is why Paul said: "I will destroy the wisdom of the wise" ("Sapientiam sapientum perdam," as his saying is usually known in Latin). We should take the term "wisdom" literally here: it is wisdom (in the sense of "realistic" acceptance of the way things are) that Paul is challenging, not knowledge as such.----------------------------一个有才干的共产党宣传员在死后到了地狱；但他很快说服看守让自己去了天堂。魔鬼发现他不在后，就马上去找上帝，想把人要回来。当魔鬼说“我的主啊……”时，上帝打断了他：“首先，我不是主而是你的同志。其次，你疯了吗，居然和一个虚构人物说话——你不知道我根本就不存在吗？最后，你长话短说，因为我还要去开党小组会议呢！”The God that we get here is rather like the God from the old Bolshevik joke about a communist propagandist who, after his death, finds himself in hell, where he quickly convinces the guards to let him leave and go to heaven. When the devil notices his absence, he pays a visit to God, demanding that He return to hell what belongs to Satan. However, as soon as he addresses God as "my Lord", God interrupts him: "First, I am not 'Lord', but a comrade. Second, are you crazy, talking to fictions? I don't exist! And third, be short -- otherwise, I'll miss my party cell meeting!"-----------------------回想一下莫扎特的《唐璜》（Don Giovanni）：当他最终面对大统领的雕像时，唐璜拒绝忏悔，拒绝放弃罪恶的过去，他完成了某种可以完全并且只能被指定为一种根本的道德立场的东西。仿佛他的顽固讽刺地颠倒了康德自己在《实践理性批判》中举的例子，康德说，一旦浪荡者得知他获得激情的满足的代价是绞架时，他就很快准备放弃这种满足：当唐璜清楚地知道等待自己的只有绞架而不是任何的满足时，他依旧坚持其放荡的态度。也就是说，从病态利益的角度看，他应该做的是完成赎罪的形式姿态：唐璜知道死亡临近，所以，通过弥补他的所作所为，他依旧不会失去什么，只有获得（即将自己从死后的折磨中拯救出来），但他“原则性”地选择坚持自己放荡的挑衅立场。我们如何能够避免把唐璜对雕像，对这个活死人的说的倔强的“不”经验为一种不妥协的道德态度的模式，尽管其内容是“恶”的？如果我们接受这样一种“恶”的道德行动的可能性，那么，这还不足以把根本之恶当作某种关于主体性等同于对善的倾向的观念的东西；我们被迫更进一步，并把根本之恶当作某种通过为善敞开空间，而在本体论上先于善的东西。也就是说，为什么恰恰是恶？恶是“死亡驱力”的另一个名称，是对某种让我们惯常的生命循环出轨的物的固定。通过恶，一个人把他自己从动物本能的节奏当中扭转出来，即恶引入了对“自然”关系的根本颠倒。所以，在这里，康德和谢林的标准构想揭示了自身的不足。他们的构想认为，恶的可能性建立在人的选择自由的基础上，由此，他可以通过让其超感性的本质服从其自我主义的倾向，而颠覆理性的普遍原则与其病态本质之间的“正常”关系。当黑格尔在《宗教哲学讲演录》（Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion）中把生成人的行动，即从动物到人的过程，视为原罪的堕落时，他是更加敏锐的：善的可能之空间，是由扰乱有机的实体整体的根本之恶的原初选择敞开的。[20]善与恶之间的选择，某种意义上，并不是真正的、原始的选择：真正第一位的选择是（随后会被视为）屈服于一个人的病态倾向和选择根本之恶之间的选择。根本之恶是一个自杀性的自我主义的行动，它为善“开辟了空间”；通过悬置生命循环的纯粹否定性的姿态，它克服了病态的自然冲动的统治。或者，用克尔凯郭尔的话说，恶是善本身的“生成模式”：它作为一种对生命循环的根本扰乱而“生成”；善与恶之间的差异关注的是从“生成”的模式到“存在”的模式的一种纯粹形式的转变。[21]这就是为何“只有刺伤你的矛才能治愈你的伤”：当恶的位置被一种“善”的内容填补时，伤口就愈合了。所以，善作为“物（即根本之恶）的面具”，是一种在本体论上次要的、重新建立失去的平衡的弥补性尝试；其在社会领域的最终范式，是把社会（重新）建构为一幢和谐的、有机的、无对抗的大厦的社团主义努力。回想一下托马斯·摩尔（Thomas More），这位天主教的圣徒抵抗亨利八世的压力，坚持自己的不屈。今天，我们很容易把他赞颂为一个“经得起考验的人”，钦佩他的刚正不阿，钦佩他对自己信念的坚持，虽然他为此付出了生命的代价。但更难想象的是，他倔强的坚持如何触动了其绝大多数的同代人：从一种“社团主义”的视角看，他的正直是一种“非理性”的自我毁灭的姿态，在它切断了社会机体的纹路，威胁到王权乃至整个社会秩序的稳定的意义上，它是“恶”的。所以，虽然托马斯·摩尔的动机无疑是“善”的，但其行动的形式结构是“根本地恶”的：他的行动是一个不顾共同体之善的根本反抗的行动。基督本身也是如此：他的活动不是被传统的希伯来共同体经验为对其生活基础的毁灭吗？他不是来“分散，而不是团结”，不是来动员儿子对抗父亲，兄弟对抗兄弟的吗？Let us recall Mozart's Don Giovanni: when, in the final confrontation with the statue of the Commendatore, Don Giovanni refuses to repent, to renounce his sinful past, he accomplishes something that can be properly designated only as a radical ethical stance. It is as if his tenacity mockingly reverses Kant's own example from the Critique of Practical Reason where the libertine is quickly prepared to renounce the satisfaction of his passion as soon as he learns that the price to be paid for it is the gallows: Don Giovanni persists in his libertine attitude at the very moment when he knows very well that what awaits him is only the gallows and none of the satisfactions. That is to say, from the standpoint of pathological interests, the thing to do would be to accomplish the formal gesture of penitence: Don Giovanni knows that death is close, so that by atoning for his deeds he stands to lose nothing, only to gain (i.e., to save himself from posthumous torments), and yet "on principle" he chooses to persist in his defiant stance of the libertine. How can one avoid experiencing Don Giovanni's unyielding "No!" to the statue, to this living dead, as the model of an intransigent ethical attitude, notwithstanding its "evil" content? If we accept the possibility of such an "evil" ethical act, then it is not sufficient to conceive of radical Evil as something that pertains to the very notion of subjectivity on a par with a disposition toward G one is compelled to take one step further and to conceive of radical Evil as something that ontologically precedes Good by way of opening up the space for it. That is to say, what, precisely, is Evil? Evil is another name for the "death-drive," for the fixation on some Thing which derails our customary life-circuit. By way of Evil, man wrests himself from animal instinctual rhythm, i.e., Evil introduces the radical reversal of the "natural" relationship. Here, therefore, Kant's and Schelling's standard formula reveals its insufficiency. That formula holds that the possibility of Evil is founded in man's freedom of choice on account of which he can invert the "normal" relationship between universal principles of Reason and his pathological nature by way of subordinating his suprasensible nature to his egotistical inclinations. When Hegel, in his LecturesonthePhilosophyof Religion, conceives of the very act of becoming-human, of passage of animal into man, as the Fall into sin, he is more penetrating: the possible space for Good is opened up by the original choice of radical Evil which disrupts the pattern of the organic substantial Whole. The choice between Good and Evil is thus in a sense not the true, original choice: the truly first choice is the choice between (what will later be perceived as) yielding to one's pathological leanings and choosing radical Evil, i.e., an act of suicidal egoism which "makes place" for the Good, i.e., which overcomes the domination of pathological natural impulses, by way of a purely negative gesture of suspending the life-circuit. Or, to refer to Kierkegaard's terms, Evil is Good itself "in the mode of becoming": it "becomes" as a radical disruption of the life- the difference between Good and Evil concerns a purely formal conversion from the mode of "becoming" into the mode of "being."This is how "only the spear that smote you can heal the wound": the wound is healed when the place of Evil is filled out by a "good" content. Good qua "the mask of the Thing (i.e., of radical Evil)" ( Lacan) is thus an onto logically secondary, supplementary attempt to reestabl its ultimate paradigm in the social sphere is the corporatist endeavor to (re)construct society as a harmonious, organic, nonantagonistic edifice. Suffice it to recall Thomas More, the Catholic saint who resisted the pressure of Henry VIII to approve of his divorce. It is easy for us today to eulogize him as a "man for all seasons," to admire his inexorable sense of rectitude, his perseverance in his convictions although the price to be paid for it was his life. What is far more difficult to imagine is the way his stubborn perseverance must have struck the majority of his contemporaries: from a "communitarian" point of view, his rectitude was an "irrational" self-destructive gesture which was "evil" in the sense that it cut into the texture of the social body, threatening the stability of the crown and thereby of the entire social order. So, although the motivations of Thomas More were undoubtedly "good," the very formal structure of his act was"radically evil": his was an act of radical defiance which disregarded the Good of community. And was it not the same with Christ himself, whose activity was experienced by the traditional Hebrew community as destructive of the very foundations of their life? Did he not come "to divide, not to unite," to set son against father, brother against brother
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