On-line version ISSN
Rev. bras. polít. int. vol.53 no.2 Brasília
http://dx.doi.org/10.-00011
Brazilian Business World: The difficult adaptation to Globalization
Empresas brasileiras:
a dif&cil adapta&&o & globaliza&&o
Caixeta Arraes
Associate Professor
in the Department of History of the University of Bras&lia ()
The article deals
with the internationalization of Brazilian businesses in the current decade.
In the 1990s, Brazil embraced economic neoliberalism and promoted a huge opening
up of its economy. At that time, Brazilian companies had to adapt rapidly. Twenty
years later, the country has reinforced its presence in Latin America and has
ensured a better position in the global markets, especially by through agricultural
Key words: Brazilian E Brazilian foreign policy
O artigo trata
da internacionaliza&&o das empresas brasileiras na presente d&cada.
Nos anos 90, o Brasil adotou o neoliberalismo e promoveu uma ampla abertura
da economia. Naquele per&odo, as empresas nacionais tiveram de adaptar-se
em pouco tempo. Vinte anos depois, o pa&s refor&ou sua presen&a
na Am&rica Latina e assegurou uma posi&&o melhor nos mercados
globais, especialmente por meio da agroexporta&&o.
Palavras-chave:
globaliza&&o;
pol&tica externa
Introduction
The internationalization
of production is when citizens of a certain country have access to goods and
services of foreign origin. There are three ways that this situation can occur:
commerce, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), and contractual relationships.&
Foreign Direct
Investment is characterized by the movement of a legally registered body (e.g.
a business or corporation) - beyond its customary frontier in order to perform
an activity through which that body can exercise the total or partial control
of a productive unit - branch, subsidiary or joint venture.&
The need for a
commercial presence via FDI is not always required for internationalization
to occur due to the segmentation of specific services such as engineering or
medicine. In these two examples, there occurs a temporary transposition of highly
qualified labor.
Another example
of internationalization can be highlighted by means of consumer intermediaries,
such as in the tourism, education and health sectors. Likewise, it is possible
to consolidate the business activity of producers and consumers in different
markets originating from two locations. A hypothetical example would be when
a British tourist is lodged at a hotel belonging to a French chain in Brazilian
territory (Gon&alves ).
With the end of
the Cold War, the 1990s saw the elimination of most of the practices utilized
by countries to limit the presence of foreign capital, irrespective of the means
- portfolio or foreign direct investment.
In the case of
peripheral or developing countries, the justification for the validity of a
specific degree of protectionism within its legal regulations was to stimulate
the generation and development of endogenous technology.&
The main objective
was to gradually replace industrial imports, an important step that was considered
essential to overcome underdevelopment, in accordance with the existing beliefs
at that time expressed by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC) and to reduce extreme social inequality.&
In the last decade
of the 20th century, international organizations such as the World Bank (WB)
and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) began to develop a response that
was very different from the thinking of ECLAC and which would severely affect
the role of the State in the promotion of a more egalitarian form of growth
from a social point of view.&
Among numerous
recommended measures, the need became apparent to structure a very different
institutional environment from the existing one or from that of national developmentalism
as found in parts of Latin America and in social-democratic countries in Europe.
It was felt that
the Brazilian State should alter its practices of intervening in the productive
sector and should thereby restrict its administration to the provision of health
services, education and basic infrastructure. Thus, governments should privatize
their corporations or provide concessions for the exploitation of specific services,
even in the cases of natural monopolies such as the water and energy sectors,
for instance.
The State should
also concurrently modify tax laws, and even go so far as modify constitutional
legislation if necessary. The objectives of these modifications would be to
attract more FDI, reinforce the right to property, ensure the permanence of
specific contracts (especially those established with global organizations like
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and financial institutions like creditor
banks), consolidate fiscal discipline and establish the liberalization of basic
interest and exchange rates.&
Thus, these recommendations
made up the ideology of liberal-developmentalism and took precedence over the
idea that the international system was composed of countries at different stages
of development.
As a consequence
of the supposed universality of such procedures, their definitive adoption would
lead to bringing about effects in various countries that would be manifested
in countless forms of instability: political, economic and even cultural.
The economic crises
between 1994 and 2002 initially had global dimensions in Mexico, Russia, Asia
(Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea), etc. until they arrived in
Argentina and Brazil.&
Despite the undeniable
record of negative side-effects of liberal developmentalism in Latin America,
there was no program structure available that could oppose it in a long-term
and consistent manner.
Brazil: the
transformation
The first neoliberal
reforms were implemented undramatically in Brazil at the beginning of the term
of office of President Jose Sarney (), who belonged to the Brazilian
Democratic Movement Party (PMDB). Along with the application of the Cruzado
Plan in 1986, the main purpose of which was to tame the exorbitant inflation
of the time, the Government changed the law to begin the complete privatization
of some existing state-owned enterprises. However, the sale of these corporations
was in practice restricted to Brazilian investors.&
In 1988, the Government
instituted the Federal Program for Denationalization to&lower the growing
public deficit, thereby fostering the deregulation of the economy and moving
public service utilities into the private sector. Later, foreign capital was
encouraged to purchase these government-owned corporations.&
From 1990, the
next President, Fernando Collor de Mello, of the Brazilian Reconstruction Party
(PRN), expanded the openness of the Brazilian economy as well the Brazilian
Plan for Denationalization.
One of its most
important aspects was that foreign capital could carry 40% of state enterprise
common stock or 100% of the preferred stock.
Interrupted by
an impeachment process in December 1992, Collor's term signified the substitution
of the national-development model by the liberal-development one. Collor's replacement,
Itamar Franco, of the PRN party, slowed down the rate of the privatizations
of state-owned corporations.
Through the implementation
of a national decree, Franco decided that the State pension funds could no longer
be part of the Privatization Program. Besides, he stated that the presidency
could limit the use of junk bonds (public debt titles) in the privatization
Towards the end
of Franco's administration in the last quarter of 1994, import quotas were also
reduced for hundreds of products, which negatively affected the balance of trade.
During the two
terms of office of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso () of the Brazilian
Social Democratic Party (PSDB), there was a continuation of the process of economic
openness and as well as of privatization. At that point, the US Government debated
setting up a continental free trade zone that would be called the Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA), similar to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) free trade agreement already established between the United States of
America, Canada and Mexico.&
The negotiation
agenda of the 34 countries in the Americas discussed the need to liberalize
the trade of goods and to introduce common legislation for matters related to
services, intellectual property, investments, subsidies, safeguards, etc.
However, the negotiations
did not include the possibility of a monetary union or the formation of a common
central bank - the dollar currency would be progressively adopted as in Ecuador
(2000) and El Salvador (2001). Labor and environmental questions did not form
the central part of the diplomatic debates.&
During that time,
the Cardoso Government was dedicated to consolidating its performance in agribusinesses
such as orange juice, coffee, meat, sugar, soybeans, etc. as well as in traditional
industrial sectors that used an unskilled labor force such as textiles and shoe
production, bearing in mind the impossibility of competing with the United States,
Canadian and even Mexican industry.
Brazil elected
to support two basic factors: cheap labor and the vast natural resources of
its ores, fertile lands and hydrographic basins.&
Despite the rhetoric
of extreme liberalization and Brazilian political goodwill, the White House
tried to shift the discussion on agricultural products to the World Trade Organization
(WTO) to reduce the accessibility of its own market to Brazilian, Argentine
and Colombian competitors, amongst others.
The deadline for
the establishment of this bloc would be 2005. All the countries in the region
would be part of it, except Cuba. Between 2001 and 2003, a 350-page memorandum
divided into 10 chapters was produced. However, due to the terrorist attack
of September 2001, the priority of US foreign policy would be greatly altered
for the next few years.
Even so, the Unites
States relaxed its position towards the free trade area of Americas. In its
portfolio of investments, the American government defended the end of policies
favorable to national enterprises and open up to foreign ones, even if they
were compensatory. In practice, the hypothetical FTAA would give egalitarian
treatment to all members, since tariffs would be swiftly eliminated.&
Thus, giving preferential
treatment to internally produced goods could not happen. In addition, any type
of restriction related to the sale of specific goods would not exist to Member
States, as happens in special export zones in countries like Brazil and China.&
The investor would
have formal permission to carry out at any time the&remittance of profits,
repatriation of capital and assets and even&receipt of interest and would
not be obliged to establish agreements concerning technology transfer. The investors
would profit from a higher status when appealing to international arbitration,
thereby&rising above the legislation&of each Member State.
It has been shown
that the regional political and economic environment was very unfavorable to
the performance of Brazilian business. This environment was incapable of&linking
up with the equivalent North American one&from&a financial and technological
point of view. In this context Government stimulation policy to specific sectors
would be abolished.&
Since the beginning
of the millennium therefore,&Brazil has begun to focus on a presumed agricultural
advantage (considered natural from the neoliberal point of view) when offering
advantages in its diplomatic negotiations with the United States and the European
Union in the areas of intellectual property, foreign investments, and industrial
services and goods. (Nogueira Batista, 7).
In January 2003,
the Brazilian Labor Party (PT) defeated the ruling Brazilian Social Democratic
Party (PSDB), after two four-year terms, from January 1995 to December 2002.
When handing the presidential sash to Lu&s In&cio Lula da Silva,
Fernando Henrique Cardoso&also left the economy in a fragile state, with
high inflation and a basic interest rate of&25% per year (source: Banco
Central do Brasil).&
In order to deal
with results of this turbulent heritage the Brazilian administration chose to
maintain economic&orthodoxy (discipline) running the risk of aggravating
the negative effects even more in the short-term. Thus, the establishment of
an initial partnership with the financial sector was justified.&
One of the greatest
symbolic measures of the PT leadership was the decision to appoint Henrique
Meireles as Head of the Central Bank. He had previously occupied a high-level
post of one of the largest US banks,&FleetBoston Financial in the 1990s.
After retiring from FleetBoston Financial, he was elected Federal Congressman
for the PSDB but he did not even take office in the National Congress because
he was asked to direct the Brazilian Central Bank.
With the presence
of Henrique Meireles, President Luis In&cio Lula da Silva's administration
assured the fulfillment of all commitments established by the preceding government,
as shown by its enthusiastic adoption of neoliberalism. For this reason, during
the first few months political renovation would not extend to other areas.&
Starting from President
Luis In&cio Lula da Silva's&very first day in charge, the Brazilian
government's&posture was to maintain the system of inflation goals set
by the&National Monetary Council and to preserve a primary surplus with
the objective of keeping the due date payment of debt interest to avoid a catastrophic
internal domestic debt default. However, the exchange rate of Brazil's currency
would continue to fluctuate.&
In this government's
eight years of administration, inflation was curbed. National economic growth&was
modest compared to countries such as China and India, despite the world economy
profiting from favorable winds until the US crisis in 2008. Between 2002 and
2008, China maintained growth rates ranging from 9% to 13% and India from 7.1%
to 9.7%&(with the exception of 2002 when India only managed 3.8% economic
growth) - Superintend&ncia de Estudos Econ&micos e Sociais da Bahia,
The spread of the
globalization process was highlighted after the Cold War with the formation
or consolidation of economic blocs, greater circulation of foreign direct investment
and regional or world tariff reductions through the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trades (GATT) and later its successor, the World Trade Organization (WTO).
In this new international
economic configuration, Brazil did not know how to properly take advantage of
the available opportunities, as is seen from the table above. From the beginning
of 1997 to the end of 1999, Brazil was able to finance the major part of its
current account deficit thanks to the arrival of&US$ 100 billion from FDI.
One of the consequences&for local industry was to adapt to new patterns
of production.&Without these new patterns, it would have not been possible
to create internal competition (Correa de Lacerda, 2007: 19).
On the other hand,
modernization allowed Brazil to plunge into the international market in a more
flexible manner, despite its interest rates, which are among the highest on
the planet - over 10% per year.&
Basically, there
are&two prejudicial effects to national business related to such high interest
rates: the difficulty of raising capital, thus hampering the decision-making
process and the expansion of activities, and the over-valuing of the local currency
that prevents the increase of exports, especially in the industrial sector.
Well-established
traditional sectors of Brazilian industry such as textiles and shoe production
have suffered due to the over-valued currency. Even the sectors that were relatively&advanced
in terms of technology, such as the automobile or chemical industries, have
not been able to compete.
In this situation
there has been a replacement of internal production by international subsidiaries
in the Brazilian territory, by imports. As a consequence, there has been a reduction
of FDI and the absorption of technology in different chains of production was
disrupted after decades of existence.&
From a social point
of view, this shift leads to negative consequences, thereby causing an increase
of unemployment and reduction of income that can be temporarily cushioned by
state interventions through the concession of unemployment benefits and family
stipends&as part of a government welfare program.&
The entrepreneurial
sector increasingly&complains about the tax quotas applied to export products
that consequently reduce competitiveness in various markets, especially those
in developing countries.&
Because of this,
Brazil finds itself in a difficult situation, because in order to achieve continuous
development without significant fluctuations it would have to increase its exports
in order to gain access to capital goods and eventually to specific raw materials
At the same time
the country has to maintain its primary surplus, which would have a favorable
result in the commercial sector, targeting the need to compensate for the deficit
in the balance of services - interest on foreign debt, remittance of profits
and&dividends, and the payment of royalties and licenses.
There is an additional
difficulty to the whole scenario: the reiteration of an agro-export model which
drives the country's foreign policy in the largest international forums. For
this reason we have seen the&constitution of the G-20 and Brazil's participation
in the Cairns Group. According to Veiga 2005:
It is widely known
that Brazil, as a major exporter of agricultural and agro-industrial goods,
has adopted an offensive stance in negotiations on the liberalization of trade
in agriculture taking place in the WTO, as well as in other negotiating processes
(...) in the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and EU-Mercosur negotiations,
Brazil has presented proposals consistent with those developed in the multilateral
arena. However, in the months preceding the WTO Ministerial Conference in Canc&n
in September 2003, an interesting process of strategy-shifting took place, involving
Brazil's stance in negotiations on agriculture (...) Without breaking with the
Cairns Group and giving up its pro-trade liberalization stance in agricultural
negotiations, Brazil led the setting of an issue-based developing countries'
coalition aimed at bargaining jointly during the Ministerial Conference and
beyond. This new coalition, the G20, brought together developing countries which
traditionally adopted differing - even opposed - positions in the agricultural
negotiations in the WTO.
Brazil occupied
the 24th place in the classificatory framework of exporting countries in 2009,
being responsible for 1.2% of the world total. This performance is considered
inefficient, notably when compared to other countries such as South Korea&at
2.9%, Mexico at 1.8%, Russia at 2.4%, and, China at 9.6%, the latter overtaking
Germany (Balan&a Comercial Brasileira, 2010).
The number of national
exporting companies in 2009 was 19,823 - the lowest level since 2004, when Brazilian
exporters numbered 21,925. It is worth mentioning that the US crisis of 2008
contributed to this shortfall.
The framework below
features the performance distribution of Brazilian firms in the global market
before the US setback:&
Soybeans and their
by-products, oil and fuel, ores, meats, sugar and ethanol, coffee and its by-products,
and tobacco and its by-products are examples of&the 15 most widely exported
products in recent years.
Throughout President
Luis In&cio Lula da Silva's administration the benefit has been observed
of the rise of commodity prices due to the growth of Chinese industry. In a
certain way, China's growing demand has compensated for the over-valuing of
the Brazilian currency, the real, up to 2008.
Brazil reinforced
its condition as a commodity producer, both in President Cardoso's administration
as well as in that of Luis In&cio Lula da Silva, not allowing consistent
reduction of its external vulnerability in order to tie its production to the
needs of consumption in other countries, especially the United States and China.
In general terms,
the capacity of a company to resist problems in the world economy indicates
its possible degree of external vulnerability. This capacity is measured in
two different ways:
Governments' response
options are found in their own economic policies. The greater the number of
response options available, the less is their vulnerability. The higher the
costs are, the greater is their exposure level, and therefore their vulnerability.&The
costs of a possible crisis might be seen in the form of a recession or depression.
It should be emphasized
that external vulnerability is always present in the situation of all former
colonies, which are incapable of overcoming alone the misfortune inherited from
their old metropolises (Gon&alves, ).
Thus, one of the
greatest economic challenges for Brazil is to overcome this situation.&
Internationalization
and insertion: the difficulty
One of the ways
to reduce vulnerability would be continuous investment in technological enhancement,
infrastructure development, and qualification of labor, thus allowing productivity
to rise and guaranteeing the conditions necessary to compete fairly in global
Since the beginning
of the 1990s Brazilian firms have been exposed to the patterns of international
competitiveness as customs and non-customs barriers have been gradually eliminated.&
During this time,
it has been found that many of these firms were not capable of entering the
global market insertion because of their technological and managerial backwardness
when compared to the similar ones of the North Atlantic axis and China.&
Two basic means
of renovation would ensure the country's international presence: exports (considering
the abundance of raw materials and low labor costs) and foreign direct investments,
when profiting from sophisticated technology, highly qualified labor, the country's
own financial resources or the capacity of obtaining them, and from a trademark
or a special product.&
The objective of
FDI is to assure the reduction of production costs that can be obtained through
easy access to raw materials, infrastructure expansion, political regime, size
of consumer market, and the possibility of joint ventures with local businesses.&
How can Brazil
become more visible in the next 20 years? First, compared to the Unites States,
Germany, China, France or Great Britain, Brazil would have a specific advantage
more concentrated in access to raw materials than in terms of methods of production
and technology generation and more efficient commercialization.&
In theory, exports
could precede FDI when first verifying the acceptability of a&specific
product in a market. Its incorporation to the consumption patterns of another
country could stimulate its production on a larger scale. However, in practice,
Brazil has not achieved any desired success in this sense.&
According to the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in 2008 Brazil
had only three business among the 100 largest in developing countries in terms
of foreign assets (not taking into consideration financial corporations): Vale
(do Rio Doce), was in ninth place in the area of &Petrobras,
was in 16th place in the area of the exploitation, refining and distributi Gerdau, in 18th place in the sector of metallurgy. None of them
is included among the world's 100 biggest companies.&
Compared with other
countries in Latin America, Mexico had four of the region's 100 largest companies,
Cemex, in third place
Argentina, only one: Temium, Venezuela, only one: PDVSA, in the area of petroleum. Mexico was
the only country which had one firm among the planet's 100 largest companies.
Brazilian corporations
were responsible for receiving 34% of Latin America's FDI in 2007. The main
reason for this is the country's geographical, cultural and political proximity
to the Southern Common Market in&South America&(MERCOSUR). It is worth
mentioning that the foreign policy of President Luis In&cio da Silva's
administration has been much more enthusiastic about a closer relationship with
the continent than the preceding administration.&
The company with
the greatest presence in Latin America was Gerdau, with purchases in Mexico
and Venezuela. However, up to 2007, Petrobras was considered the most geographically
diversified corporation with branches in almost 21 countries, followed by Gerdau
and Vale, both with 18 foreign subsidiaries.
Among the 10 largest
Brazilian enterprises throughout the world, Norberto Odebrecht, (construction),
Perdig&o (food), and Stefanini IT (computer sciences consultancy) were
established in 14 countries. Sadia (food) and Camargo Corr&a (construction)
were in 13 countries. Randon, (automobiles), and Andrade Gutierrez (construction),
were in 12 and 11 countries respectively. (Funda&&o Dom Cabral,
In 2009, there
was a change in this situation: Vale became the major Brazilian conglomerate
in international terms, with branches in 33 countries, followed by Petrobras,
in 26 countries, and the Banco do Brasil in 23 countries.
Completing the
list of the 10 biggest national firms abroad, we have Votorantim, a conglomerate
in the capital goods sector,&in 21 countries, Weg in the area of automation
and Brasil Foods in 20 countries, Odebrecht in 16 countries, Stefanini IT in
10 countries and finally Camargo Corr&a and Gerdau in 14 countries.
Brazilian transnational
corporations continue to favor Latin America in terms of investment (Funda&&o
Dom Cabral ).
Conclusion
At the beginning
of the 1990s, Brazil joined the neoliberal democratic circle, after the direct
election of Fernando Collor de Mello. From them on, Brazil's economic insertion
in the international context has been gradually based on a process of 'reprimarization',
to use the term coined by the economist Reinaldo Gon&alves (Dur&o,
Foreign policy
has been employed with the objective of reinforcing the country's agro-exporting
character, in accordance with the activities of Itamaraty (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs) in multilateral forums such as the World Trade Organization (WTO),
G-20 and the unsuccessful one of the Free Trade Areas of the America (FTAA).
Internally, the
support base of this model has been supplied by the Brazilian Development Bank
(BNDES). Through its budget, the government has financed many mergers, with
the justification of better stimulating its international participation in specific
sectors, almost all of them concentrated in agricultural and extractive activities.&
In practice, the
government has centered its strength in the sector of commodities, precisely
the one that is most subject to global price variations. The process of 'reprimarization'
has negative impacts on the environment because of the possibility of predatory
exploitation of natural resources, as well of contributing to generating employment
abroad and to the reduction of in-country investments.
On the other hand,
the internationalization of businesses aids managerial and technological enhancement
through partnerships with foreign corporations.&
In addition, this
process can help reduce a possible instability in the balance of payments through
acquiring the remittance of profits in a strong currency, and dilute research
and development costs consequent on dissemination into diverse markets.&
An option for the
next government, whose change in administration is scheduled to take place in
October 2010, is reinforcing the process of internalization of Brazilian firms
through the constitution of a specific organization similar to the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) established by the US government in 1971.&
With the establishment
of a specific corporation, a specialized bureaucracy would be instituted, separate
from functional body of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Brazilian Development
An organization
aiming at the internationalization of Brazilian enterprises would assist in&obtaining
credit with more reasonable interest rates and due dates, and contribute to
the debate on tax reform - the Brazilian system is based on cumulative taxation,
based on the invoice and gross income - and on the need to improve and enlarge
the national infrastructure.&
Even large corporations
fear to apply for international loans because of the volatility of exchange the Brazilian real is over-valued when compared to
the US dollar.&
Thus, Brazil enjoys
the necessary conditions to better internationalize its production due to the
richness of its natural resources, advanced technology in various segments and
a well-qualified labor market. However, the country cannot bring all these elements
together so as to broaden its participation in the world market in a long-lasting
and consistent way.
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Received September
Accepted November 22nd, 2010
Since November 2007, the corporation has withdrawn the name 'Vale do Rio Doce'
in favor of the new name of 'Vale'.
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