Groundwork
Instructor: Dr.
Bob Zunjic
IMMANUEL KANT
The Foundations of
the Metaphysics of Morals
An Outline		
Having elucidated the a priori
conditions of human knowledge in the realm of natural necessity
(The Critique of Pure Reason, 1781) Kant set out to examine
the universal principles of human conduct in the realm of freedom
(The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785). In
the manner paralleling his effort to draw the boundaries of all
possible human knowledge he wanted to define the limits of human
strivings to satisfy our inclinations. Kant was resolved to accomplish
his task in an absolutely binding way which necessitated to establish
a further parallelism between the two parts of critical philosophy.
As the theoretical philosophy was concerned with the a priori
grounds for judgments about experience so the practical philosophy
should be interested to explicate the a priori grounds
for moral action and our judgments of the good. The determination
of human conduct and setting limits to our desires must be based
on the fundamental awareness of the universality of moral law.
Consequently the moral obligation derived from the pure reason
as it alone formulates universal and non-empirical rules of action.
The ellectronic text of the treatise in Abbott's translation could
be consulted at the following site:
I A Rationalist Conception of Morality
of Departure:
Kant openly admits that he wants to &construct&
a &pure& philosophy of morality. In other words, he wants
to create a philosophy of morality freed from everything empirical
and proceeding from purely a priori principles. These principles
will represent the lasting and firm foundations of ethics (which
explainst the totle of the work). Since they are not empirical (in
fact, they are supersensible) the second part of the title perfectly
befits their status (= The Metaphysics of Morals).
Note: It is tempting to
compare Kant's title with Newton's Mathematical Principles of the
Philosophy of Nature. The inspiration is common as long as we
think of a priori legislation (connecting all appearances by
virtue of an innexorable law and binding all individuals by the universality
of moral obligation) but one must not forget that the realm of nature
is the realm of necessity while the realm of morality presupposes
Why do we need such a philosophy of morality?
Because otherwise we shall have a philosophy of
morality (= ethics) only by name while the content would belong
rather to anthropology, psychology or sociology. &Moral force&
should not be based on empirical considerations of what people actually
want but on the power of the will guided solely by reason.
Note: Kant's view stands
in a stark contrast to utilitarianism and its stress on the need
to ground philosophy of morality on strictly empirical concerns,
for instance on what people actually prefer to do. For Kant, moral
philosophy is about binding obligations and not about actual feelings
and natural inclinations (the &value of pleasures&).
This explains a differnce in self-perception of these two concurring
moral philosophies. While Bentham denies that the philosophy which
describes actual preferences should be regarded as a novelty (as
it allegedly only states what people have been knowing since the
time immemorial) Kant does not shun from claiming to create an entirely
new construction that would enlighten people about the true nature
of morality.
Factuality:
A pure philosophy of morality did not exist
yet at the time. What existed under the name of philosophy of morality
was based either on human sentiments (Scotish moralists) or on inclinations
(Utilitarians).
Kant was convinced that it was wrong (and strictly speaking impossible)
to derive what people ought to do from what they feel
or actually do. What people actually do is not necessarily in conformity with the universal law of reason.
Indication:
But is a &pure& philosophy of morality
possible at all and does it have any backing in reality?
Kant's answer to both questions is &Yes&. He invokes as
evidence the way how ordinary people understand the idea of duty and
moral law. All people possess an innate intuition that morality is
about sticking to a set of compulsory rules. People may disagree on
particular norms or even breach them but this does not invalidate
the binding force of the law. Even common consciousness assumes that
a moral law is something binding regardless of all natural or cultural
factors. If something is law then it must be universally binding.
In his essay &On common saying: This could be right
in Theory but it's not valid for Praxis& Kant claims that an
eight year old boy would be able to distinguish that what is dutiful
from that what is only beneficial. Kohlberg's idea of post-conventional
morality (or more precisely its second stage grounding on universal
principles) builds upon this insight. A full moral competence requires
autonomous adoption of universal moral principles.
Obligation:
Moral obligation must be universally valid
and necessary ("carry absolute necessity"). If you ought, you must.
For instance, &Thou shall not lie& is valid for everyone
anytime. This is a strong evidence in favor of really existing premises
for a purely rational morality.
Condition:
The rules of morality must be valid not only
for all humans, regardless of their cultural background or social
rank. Moral principles should be conceived as binding for all rational
beings. Universal validity in this sense is the precondition not only
for morality but for rational discourse in general. Therefore lying
is wrong first and foremost because it is not rational, not because
it is not in accord with certain desirable habits, external circumstances
or some good traits of human nature.
Note: Compare the statement of Aragorn in J.R.R. Tolkien's &The Lord of the Rings&: Good and ill are not &one thing among Elves and Dwarves and another among Men&.
Presupposition:
Humans are rational beings. Therefore they
must accept rational morality. But a tenable philosophy of morality
must be formulated so to be valid for all rational beings.
Why it is necessary to include into the class of moral subjects all
possible rational beings?
Kant's answer is short: Plainly because logic applies universally
and rational beings would be bound by it.
The range of rational beings is certainly wider than the
class of humans as it includes superhumans, aliens or some other unknown
but possible intelligent beings (gods). Kant is not doing science
fiction or rationalization of religious morality. Here he is targeting
the view of Samuel Pufendorf, who claimed a century earlier that God
could not be bound by the moral law. In contrast Kant contends that
since rational principles are valid for all rational beings they must
apply to God as well because God must be conceived as rational.
Elimination:
Relying on current conditions and human nature
misses the crux of rational morality. Moral law cannot be grounded
on how we understand the nature of man or existing human circumstances.
Moral considerations are totally separable from our contingent animality
or sociability.
Note: This statement is
directed both against the utilitarians and the moralists who reason
in the following way: Human nature consists in good sentiments or
is conditioned on pleasures, therefore you should be compassionate
or seek to increase the amount of pleasure in order to be moral.
Objection:
According to Kant, the fatal weakness of
any empirically based approach is the assumption that there is something
external to moral acts for the sake of which we behave morally. But
Kant asks what if you do not accept that external value. Are you permitted
to violate moral rules if you do not seek eternal salvation, peace
of mind or happiness? Obviously this option would be morally unacceptable.
Why then ground morality on these contingent (albeit attractive) &ifs&
instead on some permanent and universal principles?
A &pure& philosophy of morality
which elucidates universal and necessary principles of conduct "must
be possible".
We should avoid relying on or adducing empirical
grounds/reasons, such as human nature or specific circumstances
of our actions:
(a) We can know human nature only a posteriori
- as it changes (biologically and culturally).
(b) The circumstances are contingent on something
present, not permanent and universal.
Foundation:
The basis of morality should be sought a
priori in the conception of pure reason away from empirically
grounded precepts. For instance, the precept that kindness always
pays off could be true, but it could be false as well. Therefore,
if kindness is something morally valuable it should be demanded in
principle regardless of its potential payoff.
Discipline:
If moral principles are possible, they should
be the subject of a priori knowledge (= Metaphysics of Morals).
Justification:
Only reason can uncover the necessary rules
of morality (not observation, tradition or polling). Reason is the
source of moral legislation, not nature, external authorities or revelation.
The dignity of man consists in the ability to make a universal law
that he himself must obey. And man formulates the universal law by means of reason.
Note: This is clearly
opposed to the idea that the law comes from without, from religious
authority, powers that be or from inexorable drives of nature.
A priori = preceding experience,
A posteriori = coming after (or from)
Pure reason = reason operating without interference of other
(Kant has in mind especially imagination and the senses).
II Transition from Ordinary
Rational Knowledge of Morality to Philosophical Knowledge
Instead of trying to define the content of
our volition that will be the most powerful driving force for our
actions Kant seeks the law that would determine our will a priori
and only in consequence of that the object of our volition. He contends
that it was a grave mistake to derive the will from pre-existing object
of its craving - the objects should be produced only by moral law
if they are to be coveted. Kant does not give a list of desirable
objects nor does he describe which act he only
states that whatever actions we take they should spring from a will
that determines itself in accord with the moral law.
Formulation:
The essence of moral goodness is the good will
(= the goodness of moral agent). This proposition determines Kant's
the place of emphasis in the structure of moral act.
The Structure of Moral Act
Every moral act presupposes the existence
of the three moments: agent, action and effect.
Agent _____________ Action ____________ Effect
Now Kant bases moral evaluations strictly
on the quality of the agent (good character, good motives,
conformity to the law).
Definition:
The good will denotes the willingness of the subject
to do the right thing from the right motive.
Note: Later on Kant
defines the good will as &a faculty of determining itself to
action in accord with the representation of certain laws&.
For Kant the good will is the measure of moral
value. It is the primary and the ultimate object of morality - determination
of the will in accord with the moral law.
As the standard of goodness, the good will
is the only thing good without qualification (good as such,
good in itself, absolutely good, good in all circumstances).
Of course, the good will is not the only
good thing. There are many other goods and goodies.
We can conveniently divide all goods into two big classes:
I Gifts of Nature:
(a) Talents of the Mind (intelligence, wit, judgment)
(b) Qualities of Temperament (courage, perseverance, resolution)
II Gifts of
(a) Blessings of the World (power, wealth, honor)
(b) Essentials of Happiness (health, well-being, contentment)
Contingent
All of the above are good, but none of them is an absolute good,
the good without any qualification (i.e. a limiting specification).
(I) The gifts of nature are all good, but not in themselves. They
can become bad if found in a bad character (Hitler, Stalin).
(II) The gifts of fortune can lead to pride and presumptiousness
(Christian vices).
Insufficiency:
Without a good will other goods lose orientation
and constancy. This is why (a) the isolated features of good character,
or (b) the unfailing outpouring of luck are not sufficient indicators
of moral goodness.
This last remark is directed against Aristotle
who emphasizes the importance of external goods and luck for morality
almost as much as of the good character. For Kant, these factors are
&far from deserving to be called good... although they have been
so unconditionally praised by the ancients&. The principle of
moral action should be tailored to fit its own end, not some external
objectives, as the stress on these external factors may suggest. Kant
warns that it is an unfortunate and detestable event to see people
without moral merit enjoying prosperity or even the benefits of their
crimes (cf. Phalaris, the tyrant of Agrigentum, Archelaus of Macedon,
or recently O.J. Simpson - if he has committed the alleged crime).
Happiness:
As a being
who belongs to the realm of nature man has a strong desire and inclination
to make himself happy. But happiness in itself does not warrant moral
quality, it does not even indicate it. Kant believes the moral import
of happiness is overrated. Hence he vigorously opposes the tendency
of many to condition moral objectives on happiness by openly reversing
the order of virtue and happiness. His reversal is so radical that
happiness ceases to be the determining factor of our actions. This
does not mean that we should not strive to be happy - it remains a
strong natural tendency and ideally happiness should be the outcome
of virtue. Unfortunately, since happiness does not come in exact proportion
to morality it should not be taken as attesting the moral quality
of the agent. And the same holds true of its absence.
Note: Kant regards
happiness just as a psychological feeling of &contentment with
one's conditions&, that is to say as a subjective self-ascriptive
characterization. He does not consider more objective dimensions of
happiness like welfare or fulfilment and consequently avoids any substantial
definition of its content. With
good reasons he was convinced that considerations of this kind do
not belong to he philosophy of morality but to a practical art of
Permanence:
The good will constitutes the good character
of any moral agent. In fact, it is the subtance of the good character
that Aristotle could not define beyond pointing to some prudent role
models. By grounding it on the moral law Kant is capable to show how
it, in the form of good character, becomes the guarantee for the persistence
and permanence of moral attitude.
Condition:
The good will is the precondition of goodness
in all moral acts. Nothing is good morally without the involvement
of the good will. Not even those features that are conducive to the
intrinsic worth of a person or even its constituents (moderation,
self-control).
Extenuating
Condition:
Some features of good character (for instance,
calm deliberation) could be more dangereous and abominable than their
absence if they occur in a person deprived of the good will. Thus
a villain who prepares and performs a crime in calm deliberation is
morally worse and more dangerous person than the perpetrator who commits
the same deed because he cannot control his emotions and temper (in
a feat of passion).
This explains some justified discrepancies in modern penal system.
Bad temper and bad anger management could be sometimes regarded as
extenuating circumstances, while some characteristics of good character
could be aggravating factors, all depending on the absence or presence
of the good will.
Sufficient
Condition:
Every action is good if the good will is
involved no matter what it performs or attains. The good will is good
irrespectively of its effects. It is not good because it succeeds.
It is not bad if it does not succeed. The good will remains good even
if it fails to accomplish its purpose. Usefulness or fruitlessness
do not add or take away any moral value to our actions.
Non-Consequentialism:
This principle holds under the assumption
that we have tried everything within our power and not simply expressed
our good wishes for the best without even trying to do anything.
Because of this view Kant is often accused of paying much
more attention to the right motive than to the right thing that needs
to be done. To be sure, he says that an agent should not stay by sheer
good wishes requiring instead that we summon &all means in our
power&, but it still remains that the quality of the will unambigously
determines the moral quality of a deed, not the potential effects.
The good will is good for its own sake, by
virtue of pure volition, not instrumentally (as a means for something
Pre-eminent Good:
(1) The good will is better
than any particular end we might strive to attain.
(2) The good will is (morally) better than anything it may produce
favorable to any inclination.
(3) The good will is better than anything good in terms of the sum
total of inclinations (= happiness).
The good will is the condition of being worthy of happiness. Being
worthy of happiness is morally more important than being actually
Constitution of Moral Agent
The good will is the real
foundation of good character. Its governing principle is reason. This
duo secures that duties are performed as they should.
Based on the above explications the constitution of a good person
performing duties could be represented as a rhomb with the following
designations at its edges:
Structure:
Good Character
Proposition of Morality
of Good Will:
The sole unconditional
good is the good will which acts for duty's sake.*
This is a reconstruction of what Kant might and should have said,
not his own wording of the first proposition. Due to an oversight
he apparently failed to phrase the first proposition explicitly. However
the numbering of the subsequent propositions clearly indicates that
something close to this statement should have come first. It is obvious
that, for Kant, an action must be done from a sense of duty if it
is to have moral worth.
Admission:
Kant is aware that asserting the absolute
value of the good will regardless of its consequences is not a self-evident
idea. Especially not if everything rests only on what the good will
chooses while guided by reason - which does not necessarily coincides
with the pleasant and advantageous effects.
People believe that the will should follow the purposes of nature.
If so, why should reason and not some other faculty guide the good
will? Why not pleasures? What about love for other people or desire
for happiness? Are not they stronger and more important moral forces?
Note: The assumption
is that the will in itself is blind. The direction of volition has
to be determined by something. The question is only which power
will take the lead. Here is the list of candidates with their respective
shortcomings.
Considerations:
Pleasures stem from inclinations that
disregard the distinction between right and wrong.
Love is a passion, which means it is something empirical that
may assume different forms. Furthemore, it is often inspired by non-moral
motives (pleasure or desire for recognition).
Desires are in general morally unreliable to be given a leadership
role - they could be easily enticed in any direction by prospective
Thus we are left with reason
which is the necessary requisite for the good will and its guide in
Reason is the foundation
of the good will.
Definition:
An organism is a whole
suited to the purpose of life.
(a) Every organ in a living organism has a purpose. Functional
Teleology.
(b) Every existing organ is best adapted for its current function.
Optimal Teleology.
Note: The above
premises are Aristotelian.
Objective:
In order to be able to
determine the proper function of reason in an organism we need to
find out what is the purpose of the whole?
Hypothesis:
Let us suppose
that the purpose of life is happiness. (H)
Note: Happiness is the best case scenario that
could happen if we welfare being the intermediate
If the purpose of life
is happiness, instinct would be the most effective organ in serving
(a) Nature would
then instinctively choose both the ends and the appropriate means
for survival. In the Critique of Judgment Kant says that if
inclinations would leave us &it would be foolish to be scrupulous
as regards the means which procure it for us& (& 4). People
would be then evaluated by their effectiveness in seeking pleasure
not as to how considerate they may be.
(b) If this situation comes to pass reason would receive a subsidiary
role only - to assist us in appreciating the given constitution of
nature and expressing our gratitude to the &beneficient cause&
(God) for an instinctively regulated life.
(c) Reason itself would be barred from designing the &plan of
happiness& and will be denied practical influence on its realization.
Factual Statement:
However, reason
does influence our practical decisions. (F)
On the other hand,
those who follow reason fall short of true satisfaction for their
needs. Instead of providing immediate gratification of our wants reason
demands that we postpone it or even suspend it if it could not be
regarded as morally acceptable.
Correlation:
The more reason controls
action, the less satisfaction ensues (we get disappointed and even
disillusioned).
Consequences:
(a) Misology - hatred of reason - emerges among those &who
are most experienced in the use of it&.
(b) Envy toward those who follow instincts and do not indulge themselves
in the &luxuries of understanding&.
Note: Cf. &Do you
read something?& Joke.
Clarification:
The fact that we do not rave about the advantages of reason for
happiness is not a sign of ingratitude toward God or Nature. Nor
does it manifest the moroseness of our temperament. Just candidness
and sincerity. But consider F along with (a) and (b).
Inference:
If reason yet operates
in life its purpose, given all its practical blunders, could not possibly
be happiness. It must have a different, far nobler end (a higher purpose)
than happiness.
Objection:
First, reason could still be in charge
for happiness although not alone but along with other faculties. There
is no necessity that only one organ serves a complex purpose. Second,
reason could in the long run prove more conducive to happiness than
immediate gratification or avoidance of obligations prompted by instincts.
Some people even make lofty eulogies about the effectiveness of reason
in attainement of happiness (Aristotle regarded intelligence as an
instrument of happines).
Explanation:
- But reason is not the best gu on the contrary,
it is not even neutral - Kant thinks that in fact it interferes with
- This is not surprising given the accepted definition of happiness
- the sum total of inclinations. Reason appears as an impediment to
many of these. Plus, reason can never accept enjoyment as something
worth in itself.
Note: Happiness defined as &the sum total
of inclinations& is less subjective than the one based on the
feeling of contentment, but it still does not include objective factors
of well-being the way Aristotle tried to conceive. It is rather utilitarian
than Aristotelian. Aristotle has faces the same problem as Kant and
in order to avoid the depreciation of reason he significantly reduced
the range and the intensity of inclinations. Pleasures were, for him,
more concomitants than the constituents of happiness.
Reasoning:
Reason is not particularly
keen in leading the will toward the full satisfaction of our wants
(it even multiplies them by preventing instant gratification and missing
the opportunities). Reason only troubles mind and complicates our
life choices by inserting more deliberation, hesitance and procrastination.
Instinct would lead the
will toward this goal with much greater certainty (instinct is the
&big reason of the body&, as Nietzsche would put it).
But we see that the &small&
reason (intellect) operates as a practical faculty, thus influencing
directly the will.
Corollary 2:
As nature generally adapts
the means to her ends these facts point to the real purpose of reason.
It needs to be sought somewhere else, not in the realm of gratification
and satisfaction.
Conclusion:
Reason, therefore, is
not designed as a means for happiness, i.e. to produce a will merely
good for something but a will good in itself. This also represents
a higher destination of nature as such than happiness.
Complaints:
Many people complain that reason has not
made them happy unless it had made the perhaps even unhappy. Does
this mean that these people are ungrateful to the Creator (&the
goodness&) or that reason is useless and otiose like an appendix
in the body?
None of the above. Those
who complain are not ungrateful people, only not apprehensive about
the true role of reason. Truly, by giving us reason Nature has not
provided an organ without purpose. Reason has its purpose, only it
is of a different kind. Its purpose is the supreme good, the good
will, as the condition of every other good, including the desire for
happiness.
Interference:
Is this in contradiction with the claim that
reason interferes in many ways with the attainment of happiness? No,
because reason and the good will are not means for happiness - they
allow it but are not instrumental in seeking it.
If the good will is the moral condition of happiness then reason is
certainly indispensible for happiness as well but only insofar as
happiness is something good.
Inconsistency
Reason interferes with happiness in this
life, but this is not contradictory to its service to the good will.
Happiness and the good will (character) are not purposes of the same
The goal of reason (i.e. of a rational being)
is moral worthiness. It is the only unconditional value of
To be happy (to have the feeling of contentment with one's conditions
and to be able to display essential features of wellbeing) is a
natural inclination as is the striving to satisfy our desires. But
it is just a secondary end in the totality of human purposes. A
secondary goal is certainly an acceptable goal, not an obligatory
goal at all costs.
Unconditional Value
Conditional Value
Worthiness
Preference:
Kant is very candid about the secondary role of happiness in moral
life. If I am both worthy and happy, fine. But there is no guarantee
that we shall be able to attain that combination. It is more likely
that these strivings may be in a conflict. The question is then
what to do if there is a discrepancy or even a conflict between
the two? Which one is to be given prirority? For Kant, this is not
a real dilemma:
(a) The ends of inclination (personal purposes, &private ends&)
must, for the most part, be postponed or entirely abandoned for
the sake of the higher purpose determined by reason.
(b) If striving for happiness stands on the way to the good will
it should be annulled. Happiness has to move away to make room for
morality. Otherwise we'll sacrifice our moral autonomy to our desires.
(c) If happiness is not attained, nature has not failed.
Justification:
We all want to be happy, but happiness is
elusive and not a realistic project. We cannot be sure that we can
attain it even in a whole life time. Very few people can say they
are happy. Therefore, already because of this we cannot stake our
life on it. Thus we need something attainable for everyone in life.
The goal we can all attain within our lifetime is worthiness
to be happy.
Question: How to command to a finite
human being to neglect happiness as his natural desire if it stands
on the way of morality? What should prompt man to act contrary to
his natural inclinations?
Answer: The feeling of respect for moral law.
Question: How it can become the subjective motive of action?
Answer: By developing a good will.
Elucidate a notion of a will esteemed for
Distinction:
For Kant, to be esteemed and respected is
not the same as to be praiseworthy. The former is a moral category,
the latter a social and educational one.
Our starting point should be the sound natural
reason that already envisions something like a necessary moral obligation.
Moral obligation should be explicated as
existing, not taught from above as a sheer norm in the sense of an
&you ought&. It exists in the form of duty as conceived
in the common understanding of men. Its form is &you must&.
Preliminary
Definition:
Duty is what one is expected/required to
Kant introduces the notion of duty as comprising
the notion of the good will which in turn presupposes the moral law.
Restrictions:
Duties rest on some universalizable demands
but they are not formulated in a plain air. Particular duties imply
experience of human nature and the knowledge of concrete situations.
(They are those &subjective restrictions& and "hindrances"
that define the context within which duties are being performed.)
Related Division of Actions:
In order to be able to
identify truly dutiful actions Kant elaborates a very intricate taxonomy
of actions beginning with involuntary and voluntary actions and ending
with actions that ar in accordance with duty as opposed to those that
are done from duty.
HUMAN ACTIONS
Involuntary Actions
1) Actions Against Duty
2) Actions
Neutral to Duty
1) Actions Not Required
2) Actions
Required by Duty
1) Actions Done in Accordance
2) Actions Done From
Kant specifically discusses
actions I1, III1 and III2.
Actions Inconsistent with Duty
Actions conflicting with duty could be of two kinds:
(a) Those directly negating a duty or failing to abide by it.
Abusing a deposit.
(b) Those that, while violating a duty, could be useful in some
Example: Donating the borrowed money to a charity instead
of returning it to the lender.
For Kant, neither (a) nor (b) can be moral. The former is clearly
opposed to duty, the latter covertly although it might be something
useful and &good& in some other respect.
Actions in Accord with Duty
The actions taken only in accord with duty cannot be moral because
they lack the right motive. Their
conformity could be also
of two kinds:
(a) Without a direct personal inclination - if they are impelled
by some external inclination.
Example: Returning a found stolen property in order not to violate
probation.
(b) With a personal inclination - if they result from a desire
for some advantageous consequences.
Example: Sticking to the best business policy because it utlimately
In case of 2b there is a direct inclination toward the action but
it springs from a selfish calculation and not from the favor for
the action itself (i.e. the action is not done from a personal inclination
for the buyers).
Actions From Duty
Only actions of this type
are moral because they are done out of duty: doing something simply
because it is right and doing it even against inclinations.
Example: Preserving one's own life because duty requires to carry
on despite a total loss of life joy.
It is difficult to ascertain whether an action is 2b (just in accord
with duty) or 3 (really dutiful). It is much easier to determine the
defective moral character of an action of the type 1a, 1b or 2a since
these types lack a good moral motive. The moral motive is decisive
in determining the character of an action when it is evidently present
as its sole motive or clearly absent from it.
Motivation ________ Action _______ Inclination
We can demonstrate when our actions are dutiful
(morally worthy) by analyzing several examples of actions that may
be pursued both as duty requires and because duty requires.
Only the latter is moral, while the former may be just praiseworthy.
Application 1:
It is a duty to maintain one's life (either because it was given
as a divine gift or because others depend on us). The question is
when our care to carry on has a moral import?
We already have a direct inclination to
keep living.
Consequence:
Anxious care to preserve life does not have
any intrinsic worth.
Distinction:
Preserving life as duty requires
is not the same as because duty requires.
Only when preservation of life procedes from
duty it acquires moral value.
Duty - Moral Worth
accord with Duty - Morally Neutral
Carrying on
If we are weary
If we find pleasure
Because of duty
As duty requires
Application
Being beneficent is a
duty. Which philanthropic action is really moral?
There are several possible motives for philanthropy:
(1) Giving out spontaneously from compassion.
(2) Helping needy people for the mere pleasure
of satisfying others.
(3) Giving out possessions to get detached
from the world.
(4) Giving out possessions due to an overwhelming
personal grief.
(5) Donating goods callously
from the sense of responsibility.
Spontaneous Philanthropist
out from sentiments
moral worth / deserves praise
Sympathetic Philanthropist
out from inclination
moral worth / deserves praise
Unintentional Philanthropist
out to liberate himself
moral worth / deserves praise (?)
Distressed Philanthropist
out in emotional condition
moral worth / probably neutral
Indifferent Philanthropist
out from duty
genuine moral worth
It seems that Kant almost confounds 3 and
4 with 5, although the motives in these cases are not identical. Upon
careful reading it turns out, however, that he regards 3 and 4 as
preparatory stages that precede 5 in creating the distinguishing state
of indifference which allows that the sense of duty become operative.
The moral worth of an agent is established
when his/her action is beneficent from duty, not from other motives.
By doing his duty, a grumpy and insensitive person can procure a &higher
worth& for himself than a &good tempered man&.
Objection:
If an action is done from duty and at the
same time produces pleasure for the agent, why should it not be regarded
as moral and respectable?
In the Foundations Kant is not explicit on this point
for several reasons: (a) he wants to distinguish moral motives
clearly from non- (b) a moral motive appears unequivocally
as decisive only when i (c) it is not possible
to predict whether the person who shares different motives would
act in accord with duty once the non-moral motive is gone (Kant
requires a moral commitment).
It is clear however that, for Kant, a good natured person does
not act morally if he acts only due to his sentiments. A bad
tempered person can act morally if he does his duty even while
being grumpy. But there is no line in Kant which could be cited
as compelling evidence that he denies the goodness and moral
respectability of an act inspired both by moral and good non-moral
motives, especially if the effects of inclination are concomitant
and not the leading ones. Otherwise inclination and pleasure
cover the necessary inner struggle that one needs to overcome
in order to be able to accept rationally the constraint of duty.
Of course, the attitude of a person who acts from duty with
pleasure is better than the attitude of a person who acts solely
from duty and with &gritted teeth&, but the attitude
should be a manifestation of a good character based on the good
will not a spontaneous reaction stemming from a sentiment. Some
passages from the Metaphysics of Morals seem to suggest
that Kant has recognized the advantages of acting from duty
with pleasure.
Application 3:
To secure one's own happiness
is a duty, "at least indirectly".
When does it get moral?
Objection:
How happiness could be a duty if it does
not possess an intrinsic moral value and is not a moral goal?
If we can feel content it is our duty to
prefer this state over the opposite other conditions being equal.
There is nothing morally wrong in being happy if we are doing our
duty. If we can feel content why not do what is conducive to happiness
without hurting moral worth (in this sense happiness could be a duty
&indirectly&). All the more so if we can perform better
other duties when satisfied.
Note: In his essay &On the common saying:
This could be right in Theory but is not valid for Praxis& Kant
rejects the interpretation according to which he asks from man to
give up his natural purpose - happiness - while pursuing duties. Kant
was aware that this demand would not be possible
therefore, he only demanded that moral agents abstract from happiness
when responding to the call of duty. This is necessary in order to
avoid positing happiness as the condition for obeying the law. If
we disregard the advantages of happiness we demonstrate that duty
is self-sufficient as a commandment. This does not mean that we should
entirely reject happiness: Kant has realized that disgruntled persons
are more prone to disregard (&transgress&) duty.
Definition:
Happiness is a feeling of contentment resulting
from a combination of all inclinations. (This is only slightly different
from the previous definition in the sense of the sum total of all
inclinations.)
The question is, however, which one to choose and which
one to forgo.
And how to create the right combination of them all? Kant was skeptical on this matter. It seems that a man can never form any definite and certain conception of the sum of satisfaction resulting from all inclinations.
The precept of happiness in the sense of comprehensive satisfaction often interferes
with some particular inclinations.
Under these circumstances, one definite inclination usually gets
the upper hand and overcomes the fluctuating idea of happiness. Or
some present pleasures overpower all other options leading to a more general happiness. Thus the dilemma: Sacrifice present pleasures for the sake of general happiness or indulge in present pleasures even if they in the long run harm the prospects of lasting happiness (for instance, by smoking).
No matter what we choose, the present pleasure - due to a strong addiction,
or health - by refraining from the pleasure, our choice does not have
any moral worth if does not spring from a duty. Not even if we pursue general happiness and health.
In general, if happiness is our objective,
conflicts are unavoidable because people will have at their heart
only their welfare and not general moral norms.
All people already possess striving to happiness
as the strongest and most intimate inclination.
Usefulness:
Happiness is beneficial in decreasing ever
existing temptation to transgress duty but its moral value is negligable.
One should promote happiness ensuing from
duty, not from inclination. Unfortunately, we cannot command the feeling
of contentment. But we can command actions leading to it (other conditions
being equal).
- Moral Worth
with Duty - Morally Neutral
Striving for
Securing it
along the way
Focusing on
it as the main objective
Precisely in the same way
in which it makes sense to command actions leading to happiness Kant
interprets the famous moral precept from Jesus' sermon on the mount.
Application
To love others is a duty.
How can we command affections and emotions?
"Love your neighbor!" "L do
good to those who hate you." (Matt., 5; 44)
Absurdity:
Taken literally, this passage is beside
the point. No one can command us to feel love for somebody. Therefore,
love does not have moral merit.
Ambiguity:
Love is here not meant as an affection stemming
from sensuous attraction (&pathological love& = i.e. &passional
love&) or sympathy, but as an intentional effort to be kind for
the sake of duty (&practical love&). The former comes from
&the propensions of sense& the latter from the firmness
of the will.
Jesus commands to act beneficially, not to
experience an emotion. The love proceeding from the will can be commanded
as a principle of action even if it is hindered by a natural aversion
for a particular person. Benefit for &duty's sake& has moral worth.
Only when we act from duty does our action
acquire moral worth. When we act out of feeling, inclination or self-interest,
our action is not morally worthy even if it conforms to duty.
Second Proposition of Morality
Formulation:
The moral value of dutiful
actions procedes from the maxim.
Definition:
Maxim is the subjective principle of action
(the rule that guides a person's conduct).
Maxim explicates the principle of volition
(will) - this is what we call the motive of action.
Non-Consequentialism:
Moral value is derived from the principle
of volition (motive) and does not depend on the realization of the
object(ive) of the action nor on the will directed toward those objectives.
Thus the will itself is not decisive for the moral worth but the principle
that determines it.
Crossroads:
We can represent the potential determinations
of the will (at the parting of two directions) in this way:
(a) Maxim __________Will ___________(b)
A priori principle
Formal Goodness
Objectives of Desire
A posteriori principle
Material Goodness
If the will is determined by (a) the action is
moral. If it is determined by (b) the action is at best beneficent.
Conclusion:
An action could be good because of its underlying
principle but it could be good without having moral value.
Third Proposition of Morality
Formulation:
Duty is the necessity
of acting from respect for the law.
Definition:
Law is the objective principle of action
(the practical rule of conduct).
Distinction:
/&&&&&&&&&&&&&of&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&\
(a) Respect / Esteem&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&(b)
Praise / Approval
Energy of the Will
The Law of Itself
Inclinations
Esteem (or respect) is the immediate determination
of the will under influence of the law and awareness of this determination.
It differs from a simple feeling by being a "self-induced from a
rational concept".
Why only (a) could be the object of respect
while (b) deserves just praise?
Because (a) is the more "rugged" way whereas
(b) simply follows desire.
Requirement:
An action done from duty must wholly exclude
the influence of inclination. Only then we can be sure that the action
is moral and indicative of the good moral character. Therefore a struggle
with inclinations testifies about the moral capacity of the agent
to give precedence to duties.
All effects could be produced without good
will and respect for the law. Only the supreme good - the conception
of law itself requires the good will and respect for law.
Law is the practical principle for all rational beings capable
of controlling desires and overpowering inclinations.
done from Duty
Objectively
Subjectively
Conclusion:
The moral good rests in the idea of law as
Note: This conclusion does not contradict the statement that
the good will is the absolute and supreme good - the good will and
the moral law are different aspects of the same relation. Respect
for the law is the basis for the good will.
This good is not to be sought in the outcome
of the action since it is already embodied in the good character of
the agent who has acted from duty.
The Fundamental Principle of Morality
The ultimate object of respect is law as
law. Not a particular law. Therefore the law that determines the will
cannot be any law regulating how certain effects hould be brought
about. Since Kant has stripped the will of all inclinations and of
all ellegiance to any particular principle, what remains is an empty
formal principle, &the universal conformity& to &law
in general&.
What we respect in a law is its form: the
Universality of law which is at the root of its unlimited binding
How do we show respect for the formal component
of law (Universality)?
By abiding to the fundamental principle of
Simple conformity to law in general is conformity
to universal legislation.
The Fundamental Rule:
Positive Phrasing:
Always act so that that
the maxim of your action could be a universal law.
Negative Phrasing:
Never act so that you cannot
wish the maxim of your conduct be a universal law.
Condition:
Without this principle the notion of duty
loses ground (and becomes a chimera). In that case we would
be left only with involuntary actions or actions from inclinations.
Achievement:
The ultimate rule of morality provides a
standard to determine:
(a) when our actions conform with moral goodness, and
(b) whether our motives are moral or not.
Direction:
How do we know what morality requires? By
finding out what is our duty. We learn this by applying the rule of
universalization.
Universability
Confront your maxim with the law! A moral
rule must be consistently universalizable.
A common parallel to Kantian principle is
to be found in the question: "How would you like if everybody did
the same?"
Should the maxim "When pressed hard extract
you from the trouble by making a false promise" be anybody's duty?
Should I make false promises
(1) Prudence
(2) Morality
(A) In the short run
Sometimes it is advantageous
Never make promises
you do not intend to keep
(B) In the long run
It is safer not to
Difference:
Prudence advices to be truthful from the apprehension
of possible injurious consequences (B 1), but morality commands
to be truthful from respect for the law and to do the right thing
accordingly (both A 2 and B 2) regardless of consequences.
Impossibility:
Individually I may want to do what is right or convenient, depending
on what kind of person I am (what kind of character I have). But
as a rational being I cannot want that a violation of law becomes
a law. As Kant puts it: "I can will the lie. I cannot will that
lying should become a universal law."
Contradiction:
A cheat needs that other people keep their promises. Otherwise
he would not be able to deceive anybody. But a universalization
of his practical maxim refutes his own practice. He cannot propose
lying and cheating as a universal law. A law advising false promises
would eliminate promises as a meaningful concept altogether. This
means: I cannot without contradiction will to be truthful and to
be lying at the same time.
Violation:
We are in breach of the binding universality if (a) we want to
be an exception to the rule ("I am special"), or (b) if we want
that other people act differently than we do ("Nobody should follow
my example").
Rationality:
Logical reasons command respect for law, not appeals,
good feelings, religious concerns or potential benefits.
Requirements:
What kind of person can make his will good
and conformable to the law?
Eligibility:
Everyone who can check whether his maxim
can pass the test of universability.
Competence:
In order to be moral one does not need to
be a genius, an expert, let alone an incarnation of Wisdom. Just a
person capable of using reason.
Implication:
Reason requires immediate respect for a possible
universal legislation. And by making my action necessary in accord
with the law, the respect for moral law transforms it into my duty.
Obligation:
Not all universalizable maxims are duties.
And even if the maxim expresses a duty this is just a first step.
Knowing what is our duty is a necessary condition of morality, but
not sufficient. We need to perform our duty from duty (for duty's
Transition from popular Moral philosophy to a Metaphysics of Morals
Moral Instruction:
How good is teaching by examples and models?
Advantages:
(a) Great examples could serve as exhortation.
(b) They ostensibly demonstrate the feasibility
of moral principles.
Shortcomings:
(a) They do not furnish the conception of morality
(the principle) even though they presuppose an already existing
principle which they a posteriori illustrate.
(b) No matter how inspiring they fall short of the original. Therefore
it is always possible to ask whether they represent the archetype
of an action (i.e. the pattern).
Implication:
Even God must be first compared with our ideal
of moral perfection before we can recognize Him as good. God is
not good because He is God, but because His will is in conformity
with the moral law.
Note: In another place Kant repudiates Abraham
as an abominable character because of his willingness to sacrifice
(= kill) his son Isaac. Abraham should have known that God could
have not ordered something like that. If the voice Abraham had heard
has pronounced such an order the incompatibility of that order with
a universal law should have been a definitive proof that the voice
was not the voice of God. Consequently Abraham should not have obeyed
and since he did he deserves to be regarded as a lunatic.
True Original:
The idea of moral perfection both surpasses and
grounds all examples.
Conclusion:
We cannot base morality on examples and characters that
should be imitated. The fact that Kant starts with the analysis of
common understanding does not mean that he derives his principles
from experience. We can learn of law through experience, but we recognize
it as law only through reason.
(I) Formal a priori Principles
of Morality
All moral concepts are derived from reason a
priori (common and theoretical alike).
(a 1) The principles of morality cannot
be derived from experience (by induction) because they do not represent
contingent knowledge.
(a 2) The more empirical are the principles
the less powerful and morally valid will they be.
(II) Defining Pure Practical Reason
Rational foundation of morality should be established
by mapping the realm of practical reason.
(b 1) It is necessary to determine the scope
of pure rational morality (i.e. of the faculty of pure practical reason).
(b 2) The principles of pure practical reason
should be derived from the "general concept of a rational being" (they
should not be dependent on the particular nature of human reason).
(III) Moral Philosophy as Metaphysics
We need a metaphysical system of general and particular
principles of duties.
(c 1) the Metaphysics of Morals is necessary
to determine the "moral element of duty in right actions for purposes
of speculative criticism" (theoretical purpose).
(c 2) It is necessary "to base morals on their
genuine principles, even for common practical purposes, especially
of moral instruction" (practical purpose).
Would it be easier (expedient) to teach children to
do good things for some reason instead of asking them to do them because
it is just right?
Perhaps, but that would be tantamount to a dismissal
of morality, because morality is not a means for any other purpose. If we give up certain purpose this will leave the precept that depended on that purpose hanging in the vacuum.
The Possibility of a Categorical Imperative
Definition:
Imperative is the expression of the rational awareness
of an objective principle which constrains the will.
How the imperative of morality is possible?
How an imperative constrains the will by imposing obligation
We need the elucidation of its possibility in order
to be able to understand its nature rather than to establish it.
There are two types of imperatives:
(a) hypothetical and (b) categorical.
Hypothetical:
(a) imperatives are possible based on a hypothesis
stating your wish (x) and then pointing to the steps or means
leading to its realization (y).
The connection between x and y is conditional: you are
obligated to do y only if you want to achieve x. You
do not know what y requires before the condition x is
If you want to preserve your credit, do not make a false
Obligation:
The hypothetical imperative is entirely dependent on
the accepted end. We cannot state the content of the obligation before
the end is given. Then we determine the action by establishing an
analytical connection between the end and the means: the concept of
willing the end entails the concept of willing the means.
Pragmatic Precept:
It formulates the best way to proceed in order to protect
or foster one's own interests.
Assumption:
The goal is to pursue one's own desires and interests.
If the specific goal is abandoned the suggested means becomes otiose.
Categorical:
(b) imperatives are based on an a priori synthetical
proposition stating the objective necessity of acting (x) from the
conception of the law (y). One knows immediately what the imperative
requires because there are no conditions in its validity.
Connection between the personal maxim and the law is
unconditional. You are obligated to do x no matter what are your personal
desires and inclinations. The categorical imperative does not allow
any liberty to choose the opposite or to refrain from choosing.
Never make a false promise because it is something
wrong in itself.
Obligation:
The categorical imperative states the necessity that
the maxim of the action should conform to the universal law. The will
is determined by the law and the insight into the intrinsic nature
of the action.
Practical Law:
It formulates that a kind of action is bad as such
and prohibits it for the sake of the law ('do not lie', 'do not kill',
'do not commit suicide', 'do not neglect yourself', 'do not refuse
assistance to others',?).
Non-Empirical
The reality of the categorical imperative is not given
in experience. We cannot derive it from historical examples either
- they can be at best illustrative.
The most serious defect of examples is that there is no way to exclude
the presence of non-moral motives in the acts described by them. "Who
can prove by experience the nonexistence of a cause when all that
experience tells us is that we do not perceive it?" But that cause
(ulterior motive) can be there either as an inclination or a fear
of loosing credit or experiencing disgrace. Therefore it is always
better to make reference to the pure a priori law.
of the Possibility:
The possibility of the categorical imperative stems
from the possibility of a special (third type of judgments) which
in a non-definitional way a priori synthesize our actions with
the concept of the law. Although not analytical, the relation between
will and reason is still a priori and necessarily valid.
Formulation:
Act only on that maxim whereby
thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal
Imperative of Duty:
Act as if the maxim of thy action
were to become by thy will a universal law of nature.
Four Illustrations:
(1) Self-love cannot be adduced as a reason for suicide because that would be a self-contradictory argument and therefore cannot become a maxim of universal legislation.
(2) Making a 'lying promise' to extract yourself from a dire need can never become a universal law because it contradicts the very idea of promise.
(3) Neglecting natural talents for the sake of enjoyment cannot be a universal law of nature because a rational being cannot wish not to develop his faculties.
(4) The decision not to contribute anything to the welfare of others is possible as a principle of nature but it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature.
The first two examples violate some strict duties
(therefore their maxims cannot be even conceived), the second two
violate some laxer duties (their principles can be conceived without
logical contradiction, but they cannot be wished).
Two Kinds of Duty:
Strict or inflexible duties. The opposing maxim cannot
be at all conceived as a universal law due to the inherent contradiction.
Laxer or meritorious duties. Although there is no intrinsic
impossibility in conceiving their opposites it is still impossible
to will that the opposite maxim becomes a law.
Formulation:
So act as to treat humanity, whether
in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end
withal, never as means only?
Profile of the Deontological Man:
Rational, profound, rigid, uncompromising, dry,
cold, formalistic, bossy, present-oriented, respectable?
Deontological Morality:
Dutiful Actions
(Respect for Moral Law)
Worthiness
(Integrity)
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